Siegel	/	Replies	to	Brewer,	Gupta,	and	McDowell 1 Replies	to	Brewer,	Gupta,	and	McDowell Susanna	Siegel	*	Round	2 Reply	to	Brewer My	inferentialist	analysis	of	hijacked	experiences	allows	that	these	experiences	can	be conclusions	of	inference.	If	experiences	are	conclusions	of	inference	in	these	cases,	what kinds	of	mental	states	can	figure	as	the	inputs	to	the	inferences? In	Brewer's	initial	gloss	on	these	cases,	the	input	to	such	inference	is	always	another experience,	and	that	experience	always	has	a	baseline	amount	of	epistemic	power.	He	then asks	how	this	gloss	would	apply	to	memory	color,	where	one	ends	up	experiencing	a banana	as	yellowish. The	answer	is	that	it	wouldn't	because	the	gloss	is	too	limited.	The	inputs	to	inferences	that culminate	in	experiences	can	be	informational	states	of	the	perceptual	system	as	well	as cognitive	states	such	as	beliefs,	suspicions	fear	(more	exactly,	its	representational component,	as	well	as	such	components	of	other	emotions).	Inferences	to	experience	can occur	wholly	within	the	perceptual	system.1 In	my	analysis	of	the	case	of	memory	color,	the	ultimate	status	of	the	experience	depends on	the	structure	of	the	underlying	processing.2	The	conclusion	is	false,	but	this	fact	alone does	not	worsen	the	inference.	An	inference	to	a	false	conclusion	could	be	epistemically good.	It	will	be	a	poor	inference,	I	claim,	when	information	indicating	that	the	banana	is grey	is	not	given	its	due	weight,	or	the	prior	assumption	that	bananas	are	yellow	is	given too	much	weight,	or	both.	Here,	there	is	no	other	experience	that	figures	in	the	inference.	A fortiori	there	is	no	positively	charged	experience	that	figures	as	an	input	to	the	inference. So	premise	E1	in	Brewer's	reconstruction	is	not	part	of	my	analysis.	There	is	no	greyish appearance,	either	in	the	actual	experiments	(as	they're	typically	interpreted)	or	in	the cases	I	discuss.3 It	strikes	me	as	incoherent	to	say	that	a	single	experience	at	a	time	both	presents	the	same visible	parts	of	a	banana	as	two	different	hues	at	once,	greyish	and	yellowish.	If	Brewer thinks	this	may	be	my	view,	I	wonder	why	he	did	not	criticize	it	on	these	grounds. In	line	with	the	mistaken	assumption	that	perceptual	inputs	are	always	experiences	that retain	baseline	epistemic	power,	Brewer	takes	me	to	be	committed	to	a	"baseline experiential	input	immune	from	influence"	by	prior	assumptions,	and	then	says	this 1	Part	3	of	Siegel	(2017).	Jenkin	(ms)	argues	that	intra-perceptual	processes	are	sometimes responses	to	reasons. 2	Siegel	(2017),	chapter	6. 3	An	exception	to	most	other	interpreters	of	the	phenomenon	is	Zeimbekis	(2013),	who	argues	that memory	color	is	always	post-perceptual,	and	so	allows	that	experiences	in	memory	color	are veridical. Siegel	/	Replies	to	Brewer,	Gupta,	and	McDowell 2 commitment	creates	instability.	But	there	is	no	such	commitment.	Part	of	what	makes information	processing	perceptual	is	that	it	takes	in	information	from	the	environment. The	importance	and	interest	of	the	phenomena	that	motivate	the	Rationality	of	Perception thesis	stem	from	the	fact	that	experiences	can	occur	far	downstream	of	such	inputs. Phenomenologically,	experiences	are	passive	and	receptive,	but	informationally,	they	can in	principle	be	heavily	shaped	by	one's	prior	outlook.	When	that	happens,	any epistemology	of	perception	that	attributes	epistemic	powers	to	perceptual	experience	has some	explaining	to	do.	It	either	has	to	remove	the	impression	that	the	prior	outlooks	can change	the	epistemic	role	of	experience,	or	else	account	for	its	impact. Brewer	asks	what	differentiates	the	Müller-Lyer	illusion	from	illusions	generated	by hijacked	experiences	such	as	Jill's.	In	principle	the	Müller-Lyer	could	be	generated	by	a rationally	evaluable	inference,	and	then	on	my	view	the	epistemic	status	of	the	experience would	depend	on	the	epistemic	status	of	the	inferential	inputs,	just	as	with	any	inference. For	instance,	if	the	experience	is	inferred	from	a	well-founded	assumption	that	the	two	sets of	flags	at	the	end	of	the	lines	indicate	a	difference	in	length,	the	resulting	experience	could be	well-founded. And	if	there	is	no	rationally	evaluable	inference	that	generates	the Müller-Lyer	illusion,	then	that	fact	differentiates	it	from	the	hijacked	experiences	I	analyze. The	key	distinction	here	is	between	rationally	evaluable	inferences	to	experience,	and transitions	that	are	also	sometimes	called	"inference"	in	Psychology	but	do	not	redound well	or	poorly	on	the	subject's	rational	standing. Brewer	also	asks:	"How	can	[presentational]	phenomenal	character	be	a	source	of	positive epistemic	charge",	if	this	kind	of	phenomenal	character	can	be	shared	between	experiences with	different	etiologies	that	affect	the	epistemic	role	of	the	experience?	My	answer	is	that presentational	phenomenology	makes	a	contribution	to	epistemic	charge,	and	that contribution	meets	with	other	factors	to	determine	the	valence	and	magnitude	of	epistemic charge	an	experience	has.	In	the	simplest	version,	presentational	phenomenal	character determines	a	valence	and	pro	tanto	magnitude	of	epistemic	charge,	which	can	then	be augmented	or	reduced	by	other	sources	of	positive	or	negative	charge.	The	amount	of epistemic	charge	an	experience	is	adjusted	upward	or	downward	from	the	baseline, depending	on	the	inferential	route	to	the	experience,	if	the	experience	is	result	of	an inference. In	more	detail:	I	distinguish	three	ways	for	presentational	phenomenal	character	ground positive	epistemic	charge,	compatibly	with	the	possibility	that	other	factors	such	as hijacking	can	modulate	the	epistemic	charge	that	an	experience	ultimately	carries.	These three	ways	give	presentational	phenomenal	character	with	a	weak,	strong,	or	intermediate roles	in	grounding	epistemic	charge.	The	paragraph	above	describes	the	strong	role	for presentational	phenomenal	character. In	its	weak	role,	presentational	phenomenal character	makes	it	the	case	that	experience	has	an	epistemic	charge,	but	other	factors	such as	its	psychological	precursors	are	needed	to	determine	its	valence	and	magnitude,	and these	factors	can	include	hijacking.	And	in	its	intermediate	role,	presentational	phenomenal character	suffices	to	give	an	experience	baseline	amount	of	positive	epistemic	charge, absent	defeaters	or	hijacking	factors. Siegel	/	Replies	to	Brewer,	Gupta,	and	McDowell 3 All	three	roles	support	the	conclusion	that	experiences	are	epistemically	charged,	and	all	of them	allow	that	presentational	phenomenological	can	contribute	the	same	thing	to experiences	that	end	up	with	different	epistemic	powers,	due	to	etiological	differences.4 Brewer	mistakenly	assimilates	the	idea	the	presentational	phenomenal	character contributes	to	epistemic	charge	to	a	distinct	claim	which	I	reject,	which	is	that presentational	phenomenology	"contributes	a	level	of	experiential	representation untainted	in	any	way	by	the	subject's	prior	outlook."	A	hijacked	experience	ends	up	with	its content	in	part	because	of	hijacking	factors.5	Its	content	is	not	fixed	entirely	by	phenomenal character,	but	instead,	both	its	phenomenal	character	and	its	content	are	determined	in part	by	hijacking	factors.	Its	presentational	phenomenological	character	plays	a	role	in determining	its	epistemic	power,	on	my	picture,	but	the	role	it	plays	is	modulated	by hijacking	in	one	of	the	three	ways	I	just	described,	corresponding	to	the	weak,	strong,	or intermediate	roles	for	presentational	phenomenal	character. 4	There	is	more	discussion	of	this	point	in	Siegel	(2017),	chapter	3. 5	And	if	the	Factive	Explanatory	Constraint	is	false,	veridical	and	epistemically	powerful	experiences can	end	up	with	contents	via	this	route	as	well. Siegel	/	Replies	to	Brewer,	Gupta,	and	McDowell 4 Reply	to	Gupta. Gupta	on	the	scope	of	the	Downgrade	thesis Gupta	suggests	that	the	plausibility	of	the	Downgrade	thesis	would	not	be	supported	by many	accounts	of	experience.	"If	one	subscribes	to	the	idea	that	experience	represents	only appearance	properties	(as	is	argued	in	Hill	2014)",	he	writes,	"and	one	takes	experience	to warrant	only	the	attribution	of	appearances	of	properties	("e.g.	"looks	angry"),	then	there	is little	plausibility	to	the	idea	that	etiology	affects	rational	significance".	By	"rational significance"	here	he	says	he	means	the	same	as	"the	epistemic	power	of	experience"	(fn 30). Let's	distinguish	appearance	properties	that	vary	across	the	perceptual	constancies	of color,	shape,	and	size,	from	the	broader	category	of	'looks'-properties,	which	are	properties of	looking	F	for	any	F,	including	the	properties	of	being	angry	and	being	spherical.	Anger and	sphericality	are	then	not	appearance	properties,	but	of	course	it	is	possible	for	people to	look	to	angry	and	for	a	ball	to	look	spherical. The	idea	that	experiences	both	represent	only	appearance	properties	and	warrant	only beliefs	that	things	have	appearance	properties	would	have	the	consequence	that	a perceptual	experience	cannot	give	you	reason	to	believe	that	a	ball	is	spherical.	It	would also	have	the	consequence	that	a	tree	has	the	height	that	it	constantly	looks	to	have	as	you move	closer	to	it	and	its	appearance	properties	change. Such	a	view	seems	implausible	on	its	own,	as	we	can	often	easily	form	justified	beliefs about	how	tall	things	are	or	what	volumetric	shapes	they	haves	on	the	basis	of	such experiences. The	phenomenology	of	perceptual	experience	includes	the	constancies. It	therefore	wouldn't	be	much	of	a	cost,	if	this	position	did	not	sit	well	with	the	Downgrade thesis,	which	says	that	the	etiology	of	experience	can	affect	its	epistemic	power	to	provide justification	to	beliefs	formed	on	its	basis. Consider	the	slightly	more	plausible	position	that	experiences	present	us	only	with appearance	properties,	while	justifying	us	only	in	believing	that	things	have	'looks' properties	(including	appearance	properties). Gupta	thinks	the	Downgrade	thesis	would lose	plausibility	if	this	position	were	correct.	Why? I	think	Gupta	is	assimilating	the	proposition	Jack	looks	angry,	in	which	a	relational	property "looks	angry"	is	attributed	to	Jack,	with	a	proposition	about	experiences	of	the	sort	one could	form	on	the	basis	of	introspection,	such	as	one	I	might	express	by	saying	"I	am	having an	experience	that	presents	Jack	as	angry".	When	Jill's	unfounded	suspicion	that	Jack	is angry	helps	generate	her	experience	of	him	as	angry,	the	Downgrade	thesis	says	that	her experience	can't	then	give	her	the	usual	amount	of	reason	to	believe	he's	angry.	Even	if	this much	is	granted,	it	seems	implausible	to	Gupta	that	the	etiology	of	Jill's	experience	could Siegel	/	Replies	to	Brewer,	Gupta,	and	McDowell 5 detract	from	the	well-foundedness	of	her	introspective	belief	about	the	type	of	experience she	is	having. I	agree	with	this	last	point.	But	it	does	not	reflect	poorly	on	the	Downgrade	thesis,	for	two separate	reasons. First,	it	would	be	a	strange	theory	of	experience	that	limited	the	propositions	we	can justifiably	believe	on	the	basis	of	experience	to	introspective	beliefs,	if	the	contents	of experience	characterized	only	external	objects	and	our	relations	to	them.	So	once	again,	if	it turned	out	that	the	Downgrade	thesis	didn't	sit	well	with	a	theory	like	this,	one	should	just shrug. Second,	my	theory	of	downgrade	relativizes	downgrade	to	a	content	of	experience. Jill's	experience	is	downgraded	relative	to	the	content	"Jack	is	angry".	The	epistemic compromise	in	Jill's	experience	then	affects	the	role	of	experience	in	justifying	subsequent beliefs,	only	when	the	contents	relative	to	which	the	experience	is	downgraded	are relevant	to	the	experience's	justificatory	role. The	downgrade	of	Jill's	experience	will	therefore	not	affect	the	epistemic	role	of	her experience	with	respect	to	introspective	beliefs,	when	it's	not	by	virtue	of	having	those contents	that	the	experience	gives	Jill	reason	to	ascribe	to	herself	the	property	of	having such	an	experience.	(And	according	to	some	theories	of	self-knowledge,	the	contents	of experience	are	never	relevant	to	justifying	introspective	beliefs).	By	contrast,	if	Jill's experience	contents	included	self-representational	contents	such	as	"I	am	having	an	angerexperience",	then	those	could	be	relevant	to	justifying	introspective	beliefs.	But	an experience	could	be	downgraded	relative	to	"Jack	is	angry"	without	being	downgraded relative	to	"I	am	having	an	anger-experience".6 Gupta	also	suggests	that	the	plausibility	of	the	Downgrade	thesis	depends	on	the	thesis	that "rich"	properties	such	as	being	angry	can	be	represented	in	experience.	But	this	isn't	so. Suppose	that	Jill's	unfounded	fear	generate	an	experience	with	"low-level"	properties	(such as	furrowed	brow	and	clenched	mouth)	on	the	basis	of	which	one	could	reasonably	judge that	someone	is	angry.	If	the	experience	presenting	these	properties	was	epistemically downgraded,	it	would	detract	from	the	epistemic	power	of	experience	to	justify	the	belief that	Jack	is	angry. What	about	the	belief	that	Jack	looks	angry,	where	this	is	a	relational	property	attributed	to Jack,	rather	than	a	belief	about	the	character	of	one's	experience?	If	Jill's	experience attributes	to	the	Jack	the	property	of	looking	angry,	then	it	is	epistemically	downgraded	if her	unfounded	fear	helps	generate	an	experience	that	attributes	this	property	to	Jack.	Jill gets	less	reason	than	she	otherwise	could	from	her	experience	to	believe	that	Jack	has	this relational	property. 6	There	is	more	discussion	of	this	issue	in	footnote	12	of	Siegel	(2017). Siegel	/	Replies	to	Brewer,	Gupta,	and	McDowell 6 The	plausibility	of	the	Downgrade	thesis	is	thus	less	sensitive	to	ancillary	assumptions about	experience	than	Gupta	supposes. Minimal	units	of	epistemic	power In	discussing	hijacked	experiences,	Gupta	swaps	my	term	"epistemic	power"	for	"rational significance	of	experience".	I	think	this	seemingly	innocuous	terminological	shift	leads	to confusion. Gupta	formulates	his	theory	of	perceptual	justification	in	terms	of	rational	significance, because	he	thinks	experiences	make	transitions	between	Guptarian	views	rational,	rather than	harboring	epistemic	power	that	it	can	transmit	to	beliefs. By	contrast,	my	thesis	that experiences	can	be	rational	or	irrational	depending	on	their	psychological	precursors	says that	experiences	on	their	own	can	manifest	a	rational	status,	which	I	call	epistemic	charge, and	that	epistemic	charge	can	be	transmitted	to	beliefs	formed	on	the	basis	of	the experience.	Psychological	precursors	can	influence	the	valence	and	amount	of	epistemic charge	that	an	experience	has,	relative	to	a	content. In	discussing	hijacked	experiences,	Gupta	writes: "Suppose	we	say	that	experiences	render	beliefs	well-founded	not	in	isolation	but only	in	conjunction	with	...	other	factors,	including...the	relevant	antecedent	beliefs being	justified.	On	this	proposal,	the	downgrade	applies	not	to	the	rational significance	of	experience	taken	in	isolation	but	to	the	'minimal	unit'...consisting	of the	experience	and	these	other	factors.	This	move,	plausible	though	it	is,	supports Siegel's	thesis	only	on	a	reading	that	drains	it	of	all	its	novelty...Siegel's	thesis	on	this reading	provides	no	reason	to	rethink	experience	and	the	processes	leading	to	it." Here	Gupta	is	implicitly	distinguishing	between	two	theses.	First,	there's	the	central	thesis	I defend	in	The	Rationality	of	Perception: (a)	Experiences	can	have	a	status	as	rational	or	irrational	that	can	be	influenced	by	its psychological	precursors,	where	this	status	determines	its	epistemic	power	to	provide justification. Second,	there's	a	thesis	closer	to	Gupta's	own	position: (b)	Experiences	have	to	be	combined	with	other	positive	factors	to	form	a	minimal	unit that	provides	justification.	They	cannot	provide	justification	on	their	own	under	the	right negative	conditions	(no	defeaters,	or	no	defeaters	and	no	hijacking),	because	the	minimal unit	that	can	provide	justification	always	includes	more	than	experience. Gupta	then	interprets	"Siegel's	thesis"	as	taking	the	form	of	thesis	(b).	He	is	exploring	the idea	that	when	experiences	combine	with	an	unjustified	background	belief,	the	unit	of those	two	things	together	provides	less	justification	than	the	experience	together	with	a justified	background	belief	could	provide. Siegel	/	Replies	to	Brewer,	Gupta,	and	McDowell 7 There	is	no	version	of	Siegel's	thesis	that	takes	the	form	of	thesis	(b). The	effect	of hijacking,	on	my	analysis,	is	that	the	influence	of	the	background	belief	on	experiences downgrades	the	experience.	For	instance,	Jill's	unfounded	suspicion	can	reduce	the epistemic	power	of	her	experience	of	Jack	as	angry	to	provide	justification	for	her	to believe	that	Jack	is	angry.	Here,	Jill's	experience	remains	a	minimal	unit	that	manifests	an epistemic	charge.	The	fact	(as	I	see	it)	that	Jill's	experience	is	downgraded	by	etiology	does not	make	the	minimal	unit	that	provides	the	reduced	amount	of	justification	encompass both	her	experience	and	the	unfounded	suspicion.	The	minimal	unit	is	not	something bigger	than	Jill's	experience	to	which	her	experience	belongs. An	analogy	may	help	bring	the	key	claim	into	focus.	Suppose	I	believe	on	poor	grounds	that each	stalk	of	broccoli	is	a	giant	green	bacterium. My	belief	is	ill-founded.	From	this	belief (which	let's	call	B)	together	with	my	belief	that	your	fridge	contains	broccoli,	I	conclude that	your	fridge	contains	a	giant	green	bacterium.	My	conclusion	is	ill-founded,	and	that's because	it	inherits	ill-foundedness	from	belief	B.	Belief	B,	by	virtue	of	its	etiology,	manifests the	poor	epistemic	status	and	transmits	it	to	my	conclusion.	The	poor	grounds	that	figure B's	etiology	help	explain	my	route	to	my	ill-founded	conclusion.	But	B	all	by	itself	manifests an	epistemic	status,	and	so	there	no	greater	minimal	unit	to	which	it	must	belong	to transmit	its	ill-foundedness	to	my	conclusion. Gupta	on	backdoor	justification Gupta	last	point	is	that	nothing	prevents	Jill's	perceptual	belief	that	Jack	is	angry	from	being well-founded,	because	she	can	reason	her	way	to	this	conclusion	from	claims	(5),	(6),	and (7).	My	first	reply	is	that	if	Jill	forms	her	belief	that	Jack	looks	angry	(claim	(5))	on	the	basis of	her	anger-experience,	then	the	belief	is	ill-founded,	if	construed	as	attributing	a relational	property	to	Jack. If	instead	claim	(5)	is	construed	as	a	claim	about	Jill's	experience	(as	she	would	put	it,	"I	am having	an	experience	that	presents	Jack	as	angry"),	then	Gupta's	point	is	similar	to	an observation	made	by	Smithies	(2018).	Both	argue	that	Jill	has	a	way	to	form	a	well-founded belief	that	Jack	is	angry	without	relying	on	her	downgraded	experience.	She	therefore	also has	reason	to	form	the	belief	that	Jack	is	angry,	and	that	reason	does	not	include	her downgraded	experience. None	of	that	is	at	odds	with	the	thesis	Gupta	calls	"Siegel's	datum",	which	he	defines	as "Jill's	experience	does	not	render	it	rational	for	Jill	to	judge	that	Jack	is	angry". Here	too, substituting	the	idea	that	a	transition	from	experience	to	judgment	is	rational	is importantly	different	from	the	idea	that	experience	provides	ground	for	a	judgment.	The route	Gupta	describes	to	judging	"Jack	is	angry"	may	in	some	sense	be	a	transition	from	an experience	to	a	judgment,	but	it	is	not	made	on	the	basis	of	experience.	My	"datum"	is	that hijacked	experiences	relative	to	a	content	C	do	not	provide	justification	for	believing	C.7	If there	is	a	route	to	well-founded	belief	in	C	that	bypasses	experience,	then	the	subject	faces conflicting	normative	pressures.	(A	similar	issue	arises	in	McDowell's	comment). 7	I	don't	consider	this	a	datum.	I	argue	for	it	in	chapter	4	of	The	Rationality	of	Perception. Siegel	/	Replies	to	Brewer,	Gupta,	and	McDowell 8 Siegel	/	Replies	to	Brewer,	Gupta,	and	McDowell 9 Reply	to	McDowell It	is	a	question	for	Psychology	whether	fear,	suspicion,	or	vanity	can	influence	perceptual experiences,	in	a	way	that	the	cases	of	Vivek	and	Jill	would	illustrate.	By	contrast,	it	isn't	an empirical	question	whether	either	of	the	two	positions	on	the	structure	of	experience	that McDowell	describes	are	correct.	McDowell	thinks	those	positions	rule	out	that	Vivek's vanity	could	influence	the	content	of	his	experience.	He	suggests	that	it	therefore	isn't	a purely	empirical	question	whether	Vivek's	vanity	can	influence	his	experience	–	or	more generally,	whether	cognitive	penetration	can	occur. I	agree	that	question	for	Psychology	presupposes	a	philosophical	thesis	about	experience, but	McDowell	and	I	disagree	about	what	this	thesis	is.	I	think	the	thesis	is	that	there's	such a	thing	the	phenomenal	character	of	perceptual	experience	that	can	be	congruent	with what	one	fears,	wants,	suspects,	or	knows.	The	kind	of	cognitive	penetration	I	discuss	is influence	on	the	contents	associated	with	phenomenal	character.	Exactly	which	underlying metaphysical	structure	experiences	have	is	irrelevant	to	whether	cognitive	penetration	is possible.	What	matters	is	that	cognitive	states	can	affect	phenomenal	character. On	the	first	position	McDowell	mentions,	experience	is	exhausted	by	acquaintance	with items	in	the	environment,	and	bringing	them	under	concepts	occurs	in	response	to experience.	Contents	come	into	the	picture	only	with	the	application	of	concepts.	When	a face	looks	approving	to	Vivek,	he	entertains	the	content	"the	face	is	approving",	but	this content	is	not	a	content	of	experience. As	I	use	the	notion	of	experience,	it	is	individuated	by	phenomenal	character.	So	if	bringing an	item	under	a	concept	makes	a	phenomenal	difference	to	perceptual	experience,	then this	is	a	content	of	experience	in	the	relevant	sense.	McDowell	says	that	Brewer's	Object View	is	a	version	of	this	analysis.	But	Brewer	allows	that	bringing	a	concept	to	bear	on	an object	of	acquaintance	can	affect	the	phenomenal	character	of	the	perceptual	experience.	8 One	might	want	to	reserve	"experience"	for	the	acquaintance	relation,	while	allowing	that the	phenomenal	character	of	perceiving	can	be	affected	by	applying	concepts	to	things	with which	one	is	acquainted.	So	long	as	the	phenomenal	character	is	part	of	what	it	is	like	to perceive,	there	is	cognitive	penetration. 8	Brewer	(2011),	p.	123	claims	that	the	transition	from	something	"thinly	looking	F"	to	"thickly	looking	F"	can be	a	phenomenological	change.	Brewer	seems	to	hold	that	every	such	transition	would	be	phenomenal change.	I	would	dispute	that,	as	it	seems	implausible	that	if	I	hear	a	note	and	move	from	not	knowing	which note	in	the	scale	it	is	to	knowing	that	it	is	A-flat	will	necessarily	make	it	sound	differently	in	any	phenomenal sense.	Brewer's	own	example	in	which	someone	learns	that	a	shade	of	blue	is	navy	blue	also	strikes	me	as	a poor	candidate	for	a	perceptual	phenomenal	change.	Other	cases	of	coming	to	apply	a	concept	are	stronger candidates	for	introducing	phenomenological	changes,	such	as	noticing	an	iguana	hidden	in	a	bush (differentiation),	or	categorizing	some	of	trees	in	a	mixed	copse	as	pine	trees,	or	coming	to	recognize	that	a certain	sequence	moves	in	a	dance	is	a	recurring	sequence. Siegel	/	Replies	to	Brewer,	Gupta,	and	McDowell 10 The	second	analysis	McDowell	mentions	allows	that	experiences	have	contents	but	limits those	contents	to	ones	that	involve	low-level	properties,	and	so	would	exclude	the	property of	being	a	face. Here	what	matters	is	whether	the	low-level	properties	exhaust	the phenomenal	character	of	experience.	If	they	do,	then	Vivek's	case	can't	be	a	case	of cognitive	penetration. But	cognitive	penetration	in	general	isn't	limited	to	effects	on	highlevel	properties	such	as	being	a	face.	Suppose	Vivek's	vanity	influences	the	exclusively	lowlevel	contents	of	his	experience	to	include	ones	that	normally	lead	us	apply	the	concept "approving	face".	Then	the	interface	between	experience	and	judgment	would	be epistemically	okay	but	the	experience	itself,	on	my	view,	would	lose	epistemic	power. The	empirical	question	of	whether	there	is	cognitive	penetration	is	easiest	to	state	in	terms of	the	contents	of	experience,	but	does	not	make	any	presumptions	about	the	fundamental structure	of	perceptual	experience.	What	matters	is	that	there	are	properties	presented	to the	subject	that	shape	the	phenomenal	character	of	their	perception. Part	of	the	interest	of the	Factive	Explanatory	Constraint	as	I	see	it	is	that	it	seems	to	stand	or	fall	with cognitively	impenetrable	acquaintance.9	To	reject	the	constraint	is	to	allow	that	there	could be	epistemically	good	cognitive	penetration	of	acquaintance. McDowell's	second	point	is	that	we	can	safely	allow	that	Vivek	is	rational	to	endorse	his experience,	in	which	faces	look	approving,	Vivek	seems	(to	himself)	to	be	in	a	position	to know	that	things	are	as	they	appear.	He	isn't	in	such	a	position,	and	that	is	an	epistemic shortcoming	of	sorts,	but	not	one	that	redounds	poorly	on	Vivek.	Merely	seeming	to	be	in such	a	position	doesn't	constitute	any	kind	of	irrationality.	So	Vivek	can	rationally	take	his experience	at	face	value. I	can	agree	with	all	of	this	up	until	the	last	step.	Suppose	we	grant	with	McDowell	that	it	is rational	for	Vivek	to	believe	his	eyes,	because	Vivek	has	grounds	for	the	judgment	available to	him.	His	grounds	are	that	he	seems	to	be	in	position	to	know	that	things	are	as	they appear. Here	Vivek	has	a	route	to	the	belief	that	the	faces	are	approving	via	the	higherorder	belief	about	his	experience.10	He	might	reason	like	this: P1.	I'm	in	a	position	to	know	how	things	are	on	the	basis	of	my	experience. P2.	I	have	an	experience	according	to	which	the	faces	express	approval. P3.	If	I	have	an	experience	according	to	which	the	faces	express	approval	when	I'm in	a	position	to	know	how	things	are	on	the	basis	of	my	experience,	then	the	faces express	approval. Conclusion:	The	faces	express	approval. P1	is	false	(relative	to	a	context	in	which	Vivek	is	the	speaker),	but	I'm	granting	for	the	sake of	argument	that	Vivek	is	rational	to	believe	it. My	claim	is	that	Vivek	is	irrational	to	believe	that	the	faces	approve,	on	the	basis	of	his experience.	His	experience	does	not	support	his	belief.	The	issue	isn't	whether	Vivek	can 9	I	discuss	the	constraint	in	section	3	of	my	first-round	contribution. 10	Gupta	makes	a	similar	point	in	his	first-round	contribution,	as	does	Smithies	(2018). Siegel	/	Replies	to	Brewer,	Gupta,	and	McDowell 11 end	up	a	rational	belief	that	the	faces	are	approving	on	some	other	basis.	The	issue	is whether	his	experience	as	of	approving	faces	provides	him	with	reason	to	think	this. The	argument	above	bypasses	this	aspect	of	his	experience,	if	that	experience	is	not	meant to	be	grounds	for	any	of	the	premises.	If	Vivek	has	one	set	of	epistemic	resources	that	both exclude	his	experience	as	of	approving	faces	and	support	his	judging	that	the	faces approve,	that	situation	is	compatible	with	having	another	epistemic	resource	–	his experience	as	of	approving	faces	–	that	cannot	support	this	judgment.	If	he	actually	forms the	judgment,	then	which	status	the	judgment	has	depend	on	which	set	of	resources	he uses	to	arrive	at	the	judgment. Of	course	in	a	normal	case,	he	would	presumably	simply	judge	on	the	basis	of	his experience,	rather	than	bothering	with	the	higher-order	reasoning. These	observations	point	us	to	a	potential	ambiguity	in	what	it	is	to	take	an	experience	at face	value.	I've	been	using	this	notion	as	if	it	builds	in	that	one	forms	the	judgment	that	p	on the	basis	of	one's	experience	that	presents	one	with	p,	or	with	an	object	o	and	property F such	that	the	proposition	p	is	the	proposition	that	o	is	F.	One	could	use	it	more	liberally,	to mean	that	one	judges	that	p,	when	one	has	such	an	experience,	but	forms	the	judgment	on some	other	basis,	such	as	the	reasoning	higher-order	beliefs	about	the	position	one	is	in. Either	way,	the	crucial	issue	is	whether	Vivek	can	form	a	rational	belief	by	judging	that	p, on	the	basis	of	a	hijacked	experience	with	content	p. The	argument	McDowell	sketches does	not	weaken	the	pressure	to	hold	that	forming	a	judgment	on	that	basis	would	be irrational.	It	simply	identifies	a	different	route	by	which	Vivek	could	arrive	at	that judgment. Works	cited Brewer,	B.	(2011)	Perception	and	it	Objects.	Oxford	University	Press. Jenkin,	Z.	(ms)	Perceptual	learning	and	reasons-responsiveness. Siegel,	S.	(2017)	The	Rationality	of	Perception.	Oxford	University	Press. Smithies,	D.	(2018)	Comment	on	Siegel.	Analytic	Philosophy	64. Zeimbekis,	J.	(2013)	"Color	and	cognitive	penetrability"	Philosophical	Studies 165(1):	16775.